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Published on in Vol 10 (2026)

Preprints (earlier versions) of this paper are available at https://preprints.jmir.org/preprint/93703, first published .
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Enhancing Data Integrity in Online Health Surveys Through Multilayered Security Measures: Cross-Sectional Study

Enhancing Data Integrity in Online Health Surveys Through Multilayered Security Measures: Cross-Sectional Study

1Department of Medicine, Division of Geriatrics and Gerontology, School of Medicine and Public Health, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 610 Walnut St, Madison, WI, United States

2School of Nursing, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, United States

*all authors contributed equally

Corresponding Author:

Maria Mora Pinzon, MS, MD




Online health surveys have become essential tools for public health and clinical research, yet they are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated fraudulent responses, impacting data integrity and quality. Fraudulent responses are submissions that contain false, fabricated, or misleading information provided to misrepresent participation eligibility and that may include automated entries from bots or repeated entries by the same actor [1]. Pinzón et al [2] documented a dramatic erosion of usable data over time, underscoring how AI-enabled fraud and incentive-seeking behavior can overwhelm open links. Similar issues have been reported in nursing and medical research, where 70% to 94% or more of survey responses were identified as fraudulent or automated through bots [3-6]. These findings suggest that traditional safeguards, such as CAPTCHA, are insufficient for data integrity [3,7]. This study’s purpose is to describe the results of implementing a multilayered security approach that integrates automated and human-review mechanisms in a nationwide survey of health care professionals.


Overview

We conducted a cross-sectional online survey of health care professionals across the United States between November 2024 and May 2025. Clinicians aged 18 years or older practicing in the United States who have worked with patients with limited English proficiency were eligible to participate. The survey examined pain-related communication challenges with Spanish-speaking patients with limited English proficiency.

Recruitment occurred through medical professional organization newsletters and websites, health care–focused Facebook and WhatsApp (Meta Platforms Inc) groups, and the authors’ professional Facebook and Instagram (Meta Platforms Inc) pages. No paid advertising was used. We used a 2-tiered process, where posts included a direct link or QR code to the screening survey and then eligible respondents received an individualized link to a Qualtrics (Qualtrics LLC) survey.

Our multilayered security approach combines automated fraud indicators (Table 1) with a human verification process. Some indicator thresholds were adapted from prior literature based on patterns observed in our previous fraud detection work and in the current dataset. Using R software (version 4.5.1; R Foundation for Statistical Computing), we developed a fraud detection workflow that followed these steps: (1) entries were automatically disqualified based on eligibility criteria (eg, non–health care providers) and definitive fraud indicators (eg, non-US submissions), (2) remaining submissions underwent manual review where entries with more than 2 indicators received brief verification of fraudulent status, and (3) entries with 1 or 2 indicators underwent human manual verification, including confirming provider credentials using National Provider Identifier records or state professional licensing board databases. No submission was classified as fraudulent based on a single nondefinitive indicator.

Table 1. Comprehensive fraud indicators with definitions [2,8,9].
Indicator nameDefinitionThreshold or activity considered fraudulent
Technical indicators
Qualtrics (Qualtrics LLC) RelevantID fraud scoreQualtrics’ proprietary metric, measures the likelihood of fraudulent response based on multiple factors, such as how respondents interact with the survey and the metadata they generate, to spot signs of fraud or abuse. This tool was discontinued in June 2025.Score of ≥30
Non-US locationLocation of submission identified as outside United States based on IPa address.Location outside United States
High duplicate scoreQualtrics’s built-in metric, measures similarity between survey responses to detect potential duplicates.Score of ≥75
Duplicate nameExact name match in 2 or more responses with different accompanying information.≥2 occurrences
Duplicate emailExact email match in 2 or more responses with different accompanying information.≥2 occurrences
Duplicate IPIP address that matches in 2 or more responses.≥2 occurrences
IP blockSubmission from known IP blocks associated with VPNsb or proxy services—suspicious when combined with other indicators.1 or 2 blocks
Disposable emailSequential submissions from same host or suspicious email domains. Temporary email services act as strong fraud indicators [8].List of disposable email providers frequently associated with fraudulent activity
Invalid emailFound by format validation.No @ symbol
Temporal indicators
Regular wavesSubmissions occurring in waves or at regular intervals (eg, 3 responses every 5 min), especially when batches of responses are submitted within 60 seconds at consistent intervals.≥3 submissions per batch, ≥3 intervals
Rapid submissionPatterns of responses arriving in batches, often dozens per minute, particularly overnight.≥3 in the same minute
Email pattern indicators
Many consecutive consonantsCharacter sequence with 4 or more consecutive consonants. This pattern rarely occurs in authentic email addresses, suggesting random character generation.≥4 consecutive consonants
Many transitionsAlternating letters and numbers in an email address, which indicates algorithmic construction (eg, a12bcd34e@email.com).≥2 transitions
Has long numberAddresses with 4 or more digits, which previous work found may indicate automated generation rather than meaningful numbers such as graduation years [9]. Based on patterns observed in our previous work and in the current dataset, we used a threshold of 3 or more digits as a screening indicator requiring further review.≥3 digits
Low vowel/consonant ratioA mathematical approach to detect unnatural letter distribution, which emerged from our pattern analysis of confirmed fraudulent addresses.ratio of ≤0.257
Capitalized namesIn the current dataset, structures like “JaneDoe” appeared exclusively in fraudulent responses, while legitimate respondents either used lowercase formatting or included proper punctuation (eg, “Jane.Doe”). This consistent finding likely results from spam generation software attempting to mimic authentic names without understanding professional email conventions [2,8].JaneDoe format
Long local partA long email handle; previous work found that no legitimate respondents had email handles exceeding 22 characters [2].≥18 characters
Starts with numberFirst character is a number.Numeric start
No vowels in the emailAn extreme deviation from natural language patterns, which emerged from our own analysis as the strongest single indicator of fraudulent generation.0 vowels
Content indicators
HoneypotInteraction with hidden form fields designed to catch automated submission. Survey respondents see a question that says “leave blank” or a variation of it.Not empty
No contact informationContact information for subsequent emails is empty.Missing/empty

aIP: internet protocol.

bVPN: virtual private network.

Ethical Considerations

This study was approved by the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s institutional review board (ID: 2024‐1314). Informed consent was displayed in the introduction of the survey, and all participants had to agree to participate to continue. Survey responses were stored separately from contact information to ensure privacy and confidentiality. Participants received an electronic gift card of US $15 for completing the survey.


Our multilayered security approach identified 5846 of 5886 entries (99.32%) as potentially fraudulent, while only 40 were verified to be legitimate. The automated screening phase disqualified 2895 (49.18%) submissions. The remaining 2991 (50.82%) submissions underwent manual review. Of these, 2224 (74.35%) contained 2 or more indicators of fraud and required only brief verification, while 767 (25.64%) required more extensive examination. Table 2 shows that the most frequent fraud signal was the temporal regular waves pattern (n=4447, 75.55%), followed by a high fraud score (n=1614, 27.44%) and duplicate internet protocol (n=1614, 24.88%). Combined attacks were also notable, with the regular wave  + suspicious email pattern being present in 418 (7.1%) responses (Table 2).

Table 2. Fraud indicators identified in the survey responses between November 2024 and May 2025 (N=5886).
Indicator nameCount, n (%)
Technical indicators
High fraud score1614 (27.44)
Duplicate IPa1464 (24.88)
IP block860 (14.61)
Non-US location733 (12.45)
High duplicate score606 (10.3)
Duplicate name177 (3.01)
Duplicate email168 (2.85)
Disposable email74 (1.26)
Invalid email5 (0.08)
Temporal indicators
Regular waves4447 (75.55)
Rapid submission1311 (22.27)
Email pattern indicators
Long number1261 (21.43)
Many consecutive consonants935 (15.89)
Capitalized names589 (10.01)
Low vowel/consonant ratio302 (5.13)
Long local part209 (3.55)
No vowels202 (3.43)
Many transitions142 (2.41)
Starts with number21 (0.36)
Content indicators
No contact information80 (1.36)
Honeypot0 (0)
Combined attacks
Regular wave pattern + suspicious email pattern418 (7.1)
High fraud score + regular wave pattern279 (4.74)
Rapid submission + regular wave pattern + suspicious email pattern279 (4.74)
Rapid submission + regular wave pattern209 (3.55)
Regular wave pattern + email has 3 or more consecutive digits201 (3.41)

aIP: internet protocol.


Principal Findings

This multilayered security approach proved highly effective at identifying submissions with multiple indicators of fraud and distinguishing them from submissions from verified health care professionals through credential verification and manual review. Among individual signals of fraud, the most discriminative was the temporal regular wave pattern. By contrast, the honeypot captured no entries, and submissions with no contact information were rare (1.4%) and nonspecific. This suggests that contemporary threats originating from sophisticated automated systems are capable of avoiding traditional bot-detection mechanisms.

No single indicator was sufficient for adjudication because legitimate circumstances could generate these signals. For example, regular wave patterns may result from social media distribution, duplicate IP addresses may occur when using shared networks, and character-based indicators (eg, a low vowel/consonant ratio) may reflect legitimate naming conventions (eg, Schmidt). Thus, human review is essential to minimize false positives when scaling verification.

Our findings confirm that no single indicator is sufficient; detection improves when multiple indicators are combined [2,8]. Guy et al [10] reported similar results in 2 online studies of marginalized populations, showing that reliance on a single fraud detection approach would have resulted in the majority of bots or fraudulent responses remaining undetected. In our data, even the strongest single signal would have missed nearly one-quarter of fraud if used alone. Multilayered defenses enabled the accurate removal of 16% to 88% of fraudulent entries depending on context; where permissible, personal identifiers would further improve yield [3,7,10,11].

Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, we cannot formally estimate sensitivity, specificity, or overall classification accuracy, including naming traditions, because there is no gold standard to determine each submission’s true status. Second, all recruitment channels used the same screening survey; therefore, we could not compare fraud rates across channels.

As online survey fraud continues to evolve, researchers must remain vigilant and adaptive. The extreme fraud rate documented here may reflect a new reality for online studies, particularly those offering monetary incentives. While resource intensive, our results demonstrate that comprehensive fraud detection can successfully preserve data integrity even in heavily targeted surveys. Our findings also highlight the importance of recruitment strategies. Public social media posts through professional organizations and health care–focused groups may increase survey visibility and simultaneously increase exposure to fraud. Future studies should evaluate whether recruitment through professional organizations’ members-only platforms reduces fraud while maintaining adequate reach.

Conclusions

This study demonstrates that safeguarding online health survey data requires a comprehensive multitiered framework. As technology evolves, adaptive approaches will be essential to maintain the validity, credibility, and reproducibility of web-based research. Furthermore, we provide practical insights into recruiting health care professionals through professional organizations and public social media channels. Investigators should anticipate recruitment inefficiencies, and they may need to cast a wider recruitment net than anticipated and allocate substantial resources to response verification.

Acknowledgments

We thank George Levy and Maria Rosales for their work in the early stages of this study.

We acknowledge the use of Microsoft Copilot (version 4.0; OpenAI and Microsoft) and Grammarly (version 1.5; Grammarly Inc.) during the preparation of this manuscript. The AI tools were used to assist in the creation, review, and revision of the content. Specifically, Copilot was used to provide suggestions for revisions and ensure clarity and coherence in the text, while Grammarly was used to enhance grammar, punctuation, and overall writing quality. The authors take full responsibility for the integrity and accuracy of the content generated by these AI tools.

Funding

Research reported in this publication was supported by the National Institute On Aging of the National Institutes of Health under award number R00AG076966 (principal investigator MMP) and a University of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Clinical and Translational Research voucher (principal investigators ML and MMP). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

Data Availability

The data underlying this study are available from the authors upon reasonable request contingent upon execution of a data use agreement with the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Conflicts of Interest

None declared.

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IP: internet protocol
VPN: virtual privacy network


Edited by Amaryllis Mavragani; submitted 17.Feb.2026; peer-reviewed by Arryn A Guy, Joshua K Sinamo; final revised version received 11.Aug.2026; accepted 17.Aug.2026; published 02.Sep.2026.

Copyright

© Maria Mora Pinzon, Susana Fernandez de Cordova, Maichou Lor. Originally published in JMIR Formative Research (https://formative.jmir.org), 2.Sep.2026.

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work, first published in JMIR Formative Research, is properly cited. The complete bibliographic information, a link to the original publication on https://formative.jmir.org, as well as this copyright and license information must be included.